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Abstract 
The effectiveness of consumer protection in a market economy is, inter alia, 
determined by the quality of the enforcement framework of competition law and 
consumer protection law. Despite Ethiopia’s current efforts to bring about an 
effective consumer protection regime, the country has been experiencing 
various consumer abuses. This article assesses the gaps and challenges in the 
existing enforcement schemes for consumer protection in Ethiopia. Common 
features and practices of effective enforcement strategies and institutional 
designs for consumer protection, and experiences from some countries based on 
their success and relevance to Ethiopia are used as benchmarks. It is argued that 
there is failure to decentralize consumer protection and failure to recognize 
representation of major stakeholders in the Consumer Protection Authority. 
Moreover, there is lack of extensive pre-intervention study, failure to give 
priority to areas of greater consumer risks and failure to take measures against 
anti-competitive practices. These major gaps and challenges call for empowering 
and enabling enforcement institutions so that they can work more on the 
promotion of competition and meanwhile take legal measures against anti-
competitive practices. 
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Introduction  
In most developed countries, consumer1 protection is implemented through the 
promotion of competition owing to their high level of faith in the benefits of 
                                           
 Tessema Elias (LL.B;  LL.M in Business Law); Lecturer-in-Law (Faculty of Law, Hawassa 
University, Hawassa, Ethiopia);  LLM Student in Maritime Law at University of Oslo, 
Norway;  Former Attorney and Consultant at Law.  Earlier versions of some themes that 
are included in this article in their revised and expanded form were presented at Hawassa 
University Annual Research Review Workshop in May 2015.  
1 ‘Consumer’ means a natural person who buys goods and services for his personal or family 
consumption, where the price is being paid by him or another person and not for 
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well informed and stable markets to consumers. Less emphasis is thus given to 
regulatory intervention. In developing market economies, however, there is the 
need to follow an interventionist approach toward enhancing competition and 
protecting consumers due to the existence of a high level of market failure.2 In 
fact, developed or efficient market by itself may not necessarily be sufficient to 
bring about consumer welfare. So, nowadays, most countries have adopted 
consumer protection laws and institutions. 
There is a strong nexus between competition law and consumer protection 
law. The former focuses on maintaining the process of competition between 
enterprises and tries to remedy behavioural and structural problems in order to 
re-establish effective competition in the market the consequences of which are 
higher economic efficiency, greater innovation, and consumer welfare.3 
Consumer protection law, on the other hand, is concerned with the nature of 
consumer transactions by trying to improve market conditions for effective 
exercise of consumer choice.4 Consumer protection law addresses the failings in 
individual consumer transactions to grant individual consumers remedies5. To 
this end, it fills gaps that market forces leave unfilled.6 Thus, the two disciplines 
focus on different market failures and offer different remedies. Yet, both aim at 
maintaining well functioning competitive market that promotes consumer 
welfare. The effectiveness of both laws is, inter alia, determined by the quality 
of their enforcement framework.7 Therefore, maintaining both with a well 
designed implementation mechanism needs due attention. 
 Until the enactment of integrated consumer protection law June 8, 2010, 
consumer issues were addressed under different legislations such as the 
                                                                                                            
manufacture or resale (See Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation 
No..813/2014, article 2 (4)). 
2 CUTS, Competition Policy and Consumer Policy, CUTS Discussion paper series No1, 
India, May, 2003. Lack of adequate information, low level of education, existence of 
infant or /and non competitive market and existence of gross consumer abuses are among 
the characteristic features of developing countries which affect consumer choice or rights. 
3 Jaju Kanjo (2005), Recent Development of Consumer Laws in Korea, APEC Information 
Paper No.6, Korea, May 2005. 
4 Id., p. 5. 
5 Max Huffman (2007), “Competition Law and Consumer Protection”, SMU Law Review, 
Vol.6, No. 4, pp. 103-202, (Southern Methodist University). 
6 Ibid, p. 103 
7 Yassmine Afifi (2008), “Independence of the Egyptian Competition Authority: Assessment 
and Recommendations”, Global Antitrust Review, Voi.6 No. 34, pp. 339-46. Confirming 
the importance of effective enforcement framework for consumer protection, Afifi noted 
that “…competition in the market will not be achieved by the mere adoption of 
competition law, i.e. the existence of a perfectly drafted competition law without its 
effective enforcement is useless ...”  
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Criminal Code, Civil Code, and other specific legislations and were enforced by 
different institutions. In 2003, Ethiopia introduced Trade Practice Proclamation 
No. 329/2003 hereinafter called “the former Proclamation” with a view to 
secure fair competitive process through prevention and elimination of anti-
competitive and unfair trade practice, and to safeguard the interest of 
consumers.8 However, due to legal and structural limitations of the Competition 
Authority9 and non inclusion of consumer protection provisions in a right based 
interventionist manner,10 it failed to serve its intended purpose. 
On June 8, 2010, the Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Proclamation 
No. 685/2010 hereinafter called “TPCPP” was enacted. It made a comprehensive 
amendment to the previous proclamation, and it embodies more functional and 
extensive consumer protection provisions.11 On March 21, 2014, a new “Trade 
Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.813/2014 (TCCP)” was 
enacted which made some amendments on the TPCPP.12 Although the 
improvements made under the new Proclamation are commendable, there are 
still serious shortfalls that are left unaddressed. This article attempts to address 
the challenges pertaining to the institutional framework and the enforcement 
strategy for consumer protection.  
The regulation of consumer protection denotes a body of law designed to 
protect the interests of consumers at the level of the individual transaction.13 
Competition law preserves fair competition and it is traditionally conceived as 
regulation of the market practice to ensure that private conduct does not 
suppress free trade and competition.14 Competition serves to optimize 
consumers’ interests. The two fields share the same ultimate goal (consumer 
                                           
8 Article 3 of The Trade Practice Proclamation, Proc. No.329, 2003, Federal Negarit 
Gazeta, 9th Year No.49 
9 Harka Haroye (2008), “Competition Policy and Laws: Major Concepts and an Overview of 
Ethiopian Trade Practice Law”, Mizan Law Review, Vol.2, No.1, pp.33-35. 
10 Gebremedhin  Braga (2002), “Competition Regime: Capacity Building on Competition 
Policy in Selected Countries of Eastern and South Africa”  7up3 project. 
11 Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Proclamation, Proc. No. 685, 2010, Federal 
Negarit Gazeta, 16th Year No.49 
12 Trade Competition and Consumers Protection  Proclamation, Proc. No. 813, 2014, 
Federal Negarit Gazeta, 20th Year, No. 28. 
13 Nitya, Nanda, Competition Policy and Consumer Protection Policy, Viewpoint Paper for 
Competition, Investiment and Economic Regulation (CUTS-CCIER) D-218, Bhaskar, 
Marg, Bani Park, Jaipur 302 016, India, 2005, Available at <www.cuts-international.org> 
visited on 13 Jan. 2014.  
14 Id., p. 1. 
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welfare).15 According to Cornelius Dube, competition promotes Static Efficiency 
which brings about lower prices, better quality, and more choice; it also 
promotes Dynamic Efficiency which causes (a) efficient allocation of resources, 
(b) improvements in management, processing and technology, and (c) Product 
innovation.16 All of these objectives of efficiency and their respective outcomes 
and impact “have consumers as the ultimate beneficiaries and result in 
satisfaction in trade (consumer welfare)”.17 
Although their approaches to achieving that goal differ,18 the effectiveness of 
both laws is highly determined by the quality of enforcement framework. In 
light of these concepts, the first two sections of this article offer an overview of 
effective enforcement strategies and institutional design for consumer 
protection. The third section highlights factors that determine the choice of the 
design.  Sections 4, 5 and 6 briefly deal with the challenges of limited 
competition, institutional framework and price regulation.  
1.  Common Features and Practices of Effective 
Enforcement Strategies for Consumer Protection 
There is no uniform guiding principle for the adoption and application of 
effective enforcement strategies and institutional design for consumer protection 
applicable to all countries across the world. This is due to the difference in 
socio-economic and political realities exiting among nations in the world.19 
Thus, countries adjust their consumer protection laws and institutional 
framework with their respective country-specific socio-economic and political 
realities. However, there are some common principles that are advocated by 
various experts in law and economics. 
Designing and complying with effective enforcement strategies are central to 
the success of consumer protection from unfair and abusive market practices. 
This is due to socio-economic and political set up differences among the nations 
                                           
15 See Cornelius Dube, Competition Law and Consumer Protection, CUTS Centre for 
Competition, Investment and Economic Regulation Available at 
<www.cuts.international.org> last visited on 7 October 2014.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid  
19 See World Bank, Building Institutions for Markets, World Development Report: 
Washington D.C., 2002 According to WB, a survey of 50(fifty) countries’ competition 
laws and their enforcement, conducted for the purpose of world development report 2002, 
the competition authorities of different countries manifest different features regarding 
their independence, budget allocation, composition, power and functions and appointment 
of members of the commission etc. These structural and functional differences (are) 
observed even among industrial countries. 
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in the world.20 Irrespective of the differences, there are some common socio-
economic and political realities. Thus there are some common enforcement 
strategies which are advocated by many legal scholars and stakeholders as 
'effective designs for consumer protection enforcement', and are adopted by 
many countries in their consumer protection enforcement framework.21 These 
are: (a) Following more of preventive and educative approach than punitive and 
interventionist approach; (b) Setting priority to areas before intervention based 
on comprehensive study; (c) Coordination and cooperation with other organs 
having similar objectives; (d) Well studied, cost effective and flexible approach 
to intervention; (e) Facilitation of industrial self-regulation; and (f) Statutory 
guidelines for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR).22 The first 
three schemes are briefly presented below.  
1.1. Adoption of less punitive and more lenient, educative and 
responsive enforcement sanction 
The market is sensitive and does not need unnecessary intervention unless it 
fails to regulate itself. Hence, a competition and/or consumer protection 
authority needs to have guidelines which enable it to adopt less punitive and 
more lenient, educative and responsive enforcement sanction.23 According to 
Ayres and Braithwaite, a regulatory body needs to have access to hierarchy of 
enforcement sanctions that pursue the following stages of regulation:  
- Stage 1: Education, Advice and Persuasion 
- Stage 2: Written warning, oral warning 
- Stage 3: Administrative fine, injunction, payment of damage, and finally 
- Stage 4: License revocation/ Criminalizing 
The stages resemble a pyramid whereby the first stage applies to the business 
community at large while the fourth stage is applied as a remedy of last resort in 
                                           
 20 Ibid.  
 21 See for example, CHOICE, Good Practices in Consumer Protection, A Review of 12 
Australian    Regulators, Available at <http://www.choice.com.au, > See also, Marcia, 
Pardo, <Chilean Legal and Institutional Arrangements for Consumer protection>, 
National Economic Prosecutor’s Bureau Research Division, August, 2009, 
Telecomunication Management Group, <Legal and Institutional Framework for 
Consumer Protection>, ICT Regulation Toolkit, Module 6, February 2011, Available at 
<http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org>,  Last visited on Oct. 10, 2014; WB, supra note 19; 
UNCTAD Model Law on Competition, United Nations, Geneva, 2000, Mehta, P. S., How 
to Build an Effective Competition Regime in Developing and Transition Countries, paper 
published under the ‘7-Up Project’, CUTS Centre, No. 0301, 2003. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ayres, I. and Braithwaite (1992), J. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate, New York, Oxford University Press. 
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few cases. These stages show that priority should be given to education, advice 
and persuasion which are less costly, responsive and capable of bringing long-
lasting positive changes to the consumers by facilitating voluntary compliance 
of businesses with consumer protection rules. Criminal penalty and license 
revocation are thus expected to be applied only in cases where there are gross 
consumer violations and repeated non-compliance with the regulation. 
1.2. Setting priority regarding the areas of intervention based on 
comprehensive study 
Determining the priorities regarding the areas of intervention is another key 
strategy for the effective implementation of consumer protection. It must be 
based on comprehensive study because unnecessary interventions in the market 
without study or based on inadequate study may result in negative effects to the 
consumers. Therefore, an enforcing agency should apply its consumer 
protection enforcement resources to areas of high consumer risk.24 The 
enforcing agency should select the type of enforcement option most likely to 
deter unlawful behaviour, taking into account the likely extent of potential 
impact on consumers, that is, ensuring that enforcement action is proportional to 
the risk and level of harm. Before prioritization, there should be risk assessment 
on the effect of non-compliance with consumer protection and/or competition 
regulation on general consumer welfare. The risk assessment is the initial step in 
the analysis of the compliance behaviour of the target group.25 OECD indicates 
the importance of prioritization of regulatory enforcement: 
… Effective compliance can only be achieved if regulations are realistic and 
adequate for a given country – and no amount of enforcement will make 
unrealistic rules work. At the same time, in order for enforcement activities 
to deliver their expected results, they need to be properly resourced – which 
means that risk-based strategic planning must be conducted to ensure that 
sufficient resources are available to address key risks, and that over-
ambitious aims are not ascribed to enforcement agencies. Prioritization is 
essential to ensure that results are achieved where they are most needed.26 
In assessing the risk, factors such as the degree of seriousness of consumer 
harms, cost of enforcement/intervention/ and legal duty are the most important 
                                           
24 CHOISE, supra note 21,  at 33 
25 European Community Forum for Exchange of Information on Enforcement(ECFEIE), 
Strategies for enforcement of Regulation (EC) no. 1907/2006 concerning the Registration, 
Evaluation Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) Paper Prepared on 3rd 
meeting of E.C. 2-4 December 2008, Available at 
<http://www.strategies_enforcement_reach_.pdf>. Visited on 9 October 2015 
26 OECD (2013), Best Practice Principles for Improving Regulatory Enforcement and 
Inspections, Draft Report Submitted to the Public Consultation. 
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which should be followed by prioritization thereby making a prudent choice as 
to the enforcement options. Priority should be given to an enforcement option 
which is more responsive to compliance by the target group and less restrictive 
to free trade.27 
1.3. Coordination and cooperation among institutions entrusted to 
enforce consumer protection 
Coordination and cooperation of the authority in charge of consumer protection 
competition with other organs having similar objective is crucial for the proper 
implementation of consumer protection by avoiding conflict of interests 
between regulators.28 As consumer protection legislations are enforced by 
various organs having similar objective, concurrent jurisdiction may result in 
two or more agencies wanting to address the same issue or none of the agencies 
addressing an issue because each mistakenly believes that the other is pursuing 
the matter.29 There is, therefore, a risk of either a duplication of effort or issues 
falling through the cracks.  
Coordination among regulatory organs is thus indispensable. Gustavo Adolf, 
notes the problem of jurisdictional overlap among regulators and gaps in 
collaboration: 
   While it is clear that there exists the problem of jurisdictional overlap in the 
issue of the competency for regulated sectors, the greatest problem is that of 
inter-institutional collaboration among officials in public administration who 
should support one another in the benefit of a common end.30   
Therefore, there should be a legal boundary which demarcates the jurisdiction 
and practical steps in order to reduce the likelihood of such occurrences. 
Meanwhile there is the need for establishing a line of communication between 
these bodies so that their respective activities are discussed so as to take 
advantage of the synergies and to reduce overlaps and inefficiencies. This 
requires maintaining a close relationship which involves frequent discussions and 
collaboration between or among concerned regulators. 
                                           
27 Ibid, p. 24. 
28 David Miller, Competition and Consumer Protection: The Relationship in Practice in 
Jamaica, 5th IDRC PRE-INC Forum on Competition and Development, Available at 
<http://www.competition_and_consumer_protection_the_reletionship_in_practice_in_Ja
maica_Mr_David_Miller.sflb.ashx.pdf>   
29 Ibid. 
30 Gustavo Adolf, Institutional Challenges to Competition Policy in Panama, Available at 
<www.PANAMA_institutional_challenges.pdf>  last visited on 10 October 2014. 
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2. Common Features and Practices of Effective Institutional 
Design for Consumer Protection Law Enforcement 
There is no common model for the assessment of effective institutional design 
for consumer protection because the design, powers, degree of autonomy, 
composition and jurisdictional authority depends on a specific country’s legal, 
political and institutional framework.31 There are three general institutional 
approaches which are commonly used in different countries with regard to 
designing their respective institutional framework for an authority that regulates 
competition or/and consumer protection.32 They are (a) Single Authority 
/Partially Integrated Authority Model, (b) Hybrid Authority/Integrated Authority 
Model, and (c) Two Separate Institutions/Separate Agency Model.   
a) Single Authority /Partially Integrated Model/ 
As Ceres notes “[t]he partially integrated model combines the enforcement of 
competition law and some specific parts of consumer law related to information, 
such as rules against deception or misleading advertising”.33 Where a 
competition law also includes provisions relating to consumer protection issues 
(hybrid law) and if a single authority is entrusted to enforce the law, then the 
system of such design is called Single Authority System or Partially Integrated 
Authority Model.34 In this approach, the main law is the competition law and the 
main power and function of the authority are related to competition promotion. 
But only few provisions dealing with consumer protection are included to be 
enforced by the authority. Some of the countries that have hybrid law and single 
or partially integrated enforcing agent are Zambia (Zambian Competition 
Commission), Zimbabwe (Anti-Corrupt and Anti-Monopoly Programme), 
Tanzania (Fair Competition Commission), Albania (Competition Law 
Authority), Algeria (Competition Council), Egypt (Egyptian Competition 
                                           
31 See World Bank, supra note 19. 
32 The three types of classification is made by the researcher based on information from 
sources like: Kati Cseres, Institutional Design for the Enforcement of Competition Law 
and Consumer Protection Law, Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics, University of 
Amsterdam. See also Kati, Cseres, Integrate or Separate - Institutional Design for the 
Enforcement of Competition Law and Consumer Law (April 11, 2013). Amsterdam Law 
School Research Paper No. 2013-03; Amsterdam Centre for European Law and 
Governance Research Paper No. 2013-01. Available at SSRN:  
    <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2200908> visited on 11 October 2014; see FTC, International 
Activities: Competition and Consumer Protection Authorities Worldwide from 
<http://www.ftc.gov>, (Last modified lists on Wednesday 1, 2010), visited on February 
20, 2015, Cornelius Dube supra note 15.  
33 Kati Cseres, ibid.  
34 Dube, supra note 15, p. 7. 
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Authority), Italy (Autorita Garante della concorrenza e del Mercado) and 
Cameroon.35 
b) Hybrid Authority (Integrated Authority) 
The integrated model, according to Ceres, “represents an agency with a double 
mission: responsibilities for the enforcement of both competition law and 
consumer protection law”.36 Hybrid authority occurs where there are two 
different laws on competition and consumer protection in a single or separate 
pieces of legislation, “but the laws are enforced by one authority”.  Ceres sates 
that “this kind of authority usually contains two divisions within a single 
authority where one of them deals with competition issues and the other one 
deals with consumer protection”, and with regard to their hierarchy, “one 
authority may be designed to be subordinate to the other depending upon a 
country specific design choice”.37 Australia (Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission), Ethiopia (Trade Competition and Consumer Protection 
Authority), Bulgaria (Commission for Trade and Consumer Protection), 
Denmark (Danish Competition and Consumer Protection Authority), Barbados 
(Fair Trading Commission), Mongolia (Authority for Fair Competition and 
Consumer Protection), Philippines Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer 
Protection and Department of Trade and Industry), France (Directorate-General 
of Competition, Consumption and the Repression of Fraud), New Zealand 
(Commerce Commission), Panama (Authority for Consumer Protection and 
Competition Defense), Poland (Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection) and Sri Lanka (Consumer Affairs Authority), are some of the 
counties following this approach.38  
c) Two Separate or Independent Authorities/Separate Agency Model/ 
This occurs where there are two separate authorities for competition and 
consumer protection which are institutionally and functionally independent of 
each other.39 Competition authority handles issues related with competition 
while consumer protection authority handles consumer interests including 
interests under trade practice. Some of the countries following this system are 
Argentina (National Commission for Defense of Competition for Competition 
                                           
35  Cseres, supra note 32. 
36  Ibid. 
37 The trends in institutional design seem to house the consumer protection agency within the 
competition authority. Indeed, there appear to be far more countries housing their 
competition authorities with their consumer protection agencies – even though a separate 
department is created for each agency in most instances, for example Australia, Barbados, 
Canada, France, Jamaica, Japan, Malta, Papua New Guinea, Poland, the Republic of 
Korea, and the United States, to name a few.  
38 Cseres, supra note 32 
39 Ibid. 
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Promotion and Undersecretary of Consumer Defense for Consumer Protection), 
South Africa (the Competition Commission and the Tribunal for Competition 
Act, while the National Consumer Commission enforces the Consumer 
Protection Act), Canada (Competition Bureau Canada and Competition Tribunal 
for Competition and Office of Consumer Affairs for Consumer Protection), 
Costa Rica (Commission for Promotion of Competition for Competition and 
Directorate for Consumer Support for Consumer Protection), Finland (Finish 
Competition Authority for Competition and Consumer Agency and Ombudsman 
for Consumer Protection).40   
3.  Factors Determining the Choice of the Designs  
Several factors determine the choice of a particular design over the others which 
include country size, resources and expertise. 41 It is normally recommended that 
hybrid agencies are more appropriate for small economies.42 Hybrid laws and 
agencies also save resources, and are also recommended for poor countries. But 
the main disadvantage of this system is an inefficient balance of focus, skewed 
towards consumer protection matters.43 Because of the nature and frequency of 
consumer related complaints in these countries much emphasis is placed on 
consumer protection. Competition matters are often times, not given the level of 
attention and dedication that is necessary44. Moreover, absence of perfect or 
total complementarities between the competition and consumer protection 
policies may create difficulties in their implementation by one agency such as 
conflicts that can possibly occur during price controls.45  It is also said that 
enforcement might not be easy where one regulatory authority is in charge of 
implementing the consumer protection and the competition policies because this 
can imply a multiplication of the implementation gaps in the two laws. 46 
However, for effective enforcement, any type of design should be supported 
by a strong and efficient structural and organizational set up. To regulate 
effectively, the authority must create institutional frameworks that provide 
structural, political, and budgetary independence, as well as sufficient 
competence and the necessary organizational structure to carry out its 
functions.47   
                                           
40 Ibid. 
41 See Dube, supra note 15, p. 8. See also Office of Fair Trading, (2009) Joining 
Competition and Consumer Policy, The OFT’s Approach to Building an Integrated 
Agency, OFT 1151, UK, December 2009. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Adolf, supra note 30, p. 3. 
44 Ibid  
45 Dube, supra note 15. 
46 Id., p. 12. 
47 World Bank, Supra note 19. 
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UNCTAD Model Law on Competition advocates that the most efficient type 
of administrative authority is one which is a quasi-autonomous or independent 
body of the government with strong judicial and administrative powers for 
conducting investigations and applying sanctions.48 In addition, the Centre on 
Competition, Investment and Economic Regulation (hereinafter referred to as 
‘CUTS’) has identified independence, human and financial recourses as  the 
most important factors underpinning the development of successful national 
competition or/and consumer protection  institutions.49 Likewise, the World 
Bank recommends that governments need to ensure the independence of the 
competition authority50. 
In settings of developed competition culture, a competition authority is 
expected to be financially and institutionally independent and accountable to 
parliament or the public even though some transitional and emerging countries 
have made their competition authority accountable to government agencies.51 
East Asian countries like China, Korea, Singapore, Indonesia and Japan in a one 
or another way make their competition authority accountable to their respective 
executive bodies;52 the same applies to most of the African countries for 
example, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, Ethiopia53. 
Decentralization of consumer protection enforcement to the level of local 
authority can also be a major factor that affects the proper implementation of the 
protections. In India, for example, the consumer protection authority has three 
tiers, i.e. at the - National level (The National Commission), state level (State 
Commissions) and district level (District Forums)54. Accordingly, 84.57% of the 
complaints are lodged and solved by the District Forums.55  
                                           
48 See Article 8, paragraph 121 0f UNCTAD Model Law on Competition, Geneva, 2000. 
49 CUTS, Towards a Healthy Competition Culture, Jaipurs Printers P.Ltd, India, 2005.  
50 World Bank, Building Institutions for Markets, World Bank Development Report, Oxford 
University Press published for the World Bank, 2002, at pages 141-142. 
51 Maher M.  Dabbah (2010), Competition Law and policy of developing countries: A 
critical assessment of the challenges to establishing an effective competition law regime, 
Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
53/2010. 
52 Pradeep S. Mehta (2002), Competition Policy in Developing Countries: An Asia-Pacific 
Perspective, Bulletin on Asia-Pacific Perspectives. Bangkok) 
53 Abebe A.,Alemu J. and Jambo B. (2006), Competition Scenario in Ethiopia: Consumer 
Protection Perspective.”CUTS-CENTER, (August, 2006). 
54 Manoj Pandey (2010), Consumer Protection in India, Paper Presented by the Directory 
General of Competition Commission of India on 26th April 2010, New Delhi, India. 
55 Id., p. 18. 
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4. The Challenges of Limited Competition in the 
Enforcement Framework of Consumer Protection 
In a market economy, consumer protection is mainly enforced through the 
promotion of competition and by prohibiting anti-competitive practices and 
behaviour.56 Existing studies have shown that competition is a cornerstone for 
free market economy.57 Ethiopia has adopted free market economic policy since 
199158 and introduced the Trade Practice Proclamation in 200359 which was 
later amended in 2010 and 2014. Four common anti-competitive market 
practices are prohibited under a competition law of most countries, and they are 
also adopted under the Ethiopian TCCPP.60 These are: Anti-competitive 
agreements, abuse of dominance, unfair competition and merger/Acquisition.61 
These practices stifle competition in the market.  
Although Ethiopia has enacted and amended laws that prohibit anti-
competitive practices and behaviours, the level of competition in the country has 
been very low.62 Existing studies and empirical evidence show the prevalence of 
anti-competitive practices.63 Especially, anti-competitive agreements have been 
identified as the most prevalent anti-competitive practices that affect consumers 
                                           
56 Max Huffman supra note 5, p. 8. See also Abebe, Asmare, Alemu Jotie and Others, supra 
note 53. 
57 Ibid. 
58 See Industrial Development Strategy of Ethiopia prepared in 1994.  
59 The 2003Trade Practice Proclamation, supra note 8. 
60 See articles 5-13 of the TCCPP, supra note 12. 
61 Ibid. 
62 All competition  laws; i.e., the 2003 Trade Practice Proclamation, supra note 8, the 2010 
Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Proclamation,  supra note 11, articles 5-21 and 
the new 2014 Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation, supra note 12 
article 5-13 prohibit the anti-competitive practices and behaviours.  Interviews with 
traders, enterprises and consumers, Feb. 2-5, 2014, Hawassa City & on January 30-36 in 
Addis Ababa City, Ethiopia. See also the study conducted by Abebe Asmare, Alemu Jotie 
and others, supra note 53. 
 63 See for example, studies conducted by Roberto Zavatta and Samuel Feyisa , Baseline 
Survey on Competition and Market in Ethiopia, Private Sector Development Hub/Addis 
Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectorial Associations, 2009;   Fikremarkos Merso, 
Imeru Tamirat Yigezu and Others, Review of the Legal and Institutional Framework for 
Market Competition in Ethiopia, Private Sector Development Hub/Addis Ababa Chamber 
of Commerce and Sectorial Association, 2009;  World Bank (2006), Report on 
Investment Climate Survey for Ethiopia;  Interview with Merkebu Zeleke, Director 
General of Federal Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority, on March 2, 
2015;  Interview with Bruktawit Walelign, Expert in Regulatory Work Process of 
Ministry of Trade on Feb. 29/2015. 
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negatively64.  The anti-competitive agreements may have one of the following 
three forms; first, price fixation/cartel like arrangements second, hoarding and 
price gouging third, exclusive distribution arrangements.65 Price fixing is the 
most prevalent in Ethiopia and it needs attention and severe sanction.66 Prices of 
goods and services are usually agreed by the traders including trade associations 
regardless of the quality of the products and services.67  
 Various views are forwarded regarding the possible causes for limited 
competition in Ethiopia? Maher M. Dabbah has identified involvement of 
government in the local market, political factor (the level of dedication of 
government to enhance free market economy), and institutional problem to be 
causes for limited competition in developing countries.68 Moreover, 
Fikremarkos Merso, Imeru Tamirat & others have identified public sector 
dominance, price control, transparency in governments procurement and 
privatization, distorted financial market, inconsistent tax administration and 
business registration, unfair competition from party-affiliate enterprises and lack 
of awareness among business community and enforcers as some of the main 
causes for limited competition.69 According to Roberto Zavatta and Samuel 
Feyisa the problem of limited competition in Ethiopia, is among other things, 
attributable to market concentration, public sector dominance, (lack of 
involvement of) foreign investors and prevalence of anticompetitive practices.70  
Although various studies state the prevalence of anti-competitive practices as 
one of the causes which have stifled the competition in Ethiopia, they fail to 
directly indicate the contributory sources for the prevalence of such practices.  I 
argue that failure of proper law enforcement also contributes to the prevalence 
of the anti-competitive practices of business communities.  
Firstly, since the establishment of the Trade Practice Investigation 
Commission (TPIC) in 2003 up to the present Trade Competition and Consumer 
Protection Authority (TCCPA), no cases on anti-competitive agreements have 
                                           
64 Roberto Zavatta & Samuel Feyisa, Id., at 103, Fikremarkos Merso, Imeru Tamirat and 
Others, Id. at 57, interviews with Merkebu Zeleke, Bruktawit Walellign, & interview with 
Traders and Consumers in Addis Ababa  & Hawassa Cities, supra note 63. 
65 Roberto Zavatta &Samuel Feyisa, Id., pp. 102-103. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Interview with 15 fruit selling small and micro enterprises (“Associations”) and 15 injera 
selling traders in Hawassa City on 4/08/2012, 4/12/2013 and 4/4/2014. See also 
Interviews with Merkebu Zeleke &Brukitawit Walelign, supra note 63. As a consumer, 
prevalence of collusive price fixations are also evident from the writer's daily life 
experiences and observations. 
68 Maher M. Dabbah, supra note 51, pp. 12-15. 
69 Fikremarkos Merso and Others, supra note 63, pp. 53-56. 
70 Roberto Zavatta & Samuel Feyisa, supra note 63, pp.  93-104. 
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been entertained by the agencies and other organs.71 Except for cases of 
‘hoarding’ against which the Ministry of Trade and some of the regional Trade 
and Industry Bureaus, have taken serious measures, there is no evidence that 
show measures taken against prevalent anti-competitive business practices.72   
Merkebu Zeleke, the Director General of the TCCPA, said that the authority 
has immensely been working on awareness creation. He added that the authority 
has identified target groups for its awareness creation works like consumers, 
business community, investors and judges. He also said that the authority has 
been effectively using different the media, i.e. ETV, National Radios programs, 
pamphlets, brochures to create public awareness and public opinion and 
complaints, including access to a free telephone line, 8478. Although the 
educative and informative approach of the authority is commendable, it is also 
necessary to apply the law enforcement approaches against anti-competitive 
practices that are typically associated with undue profit seeking or opportunistic 
behaviour than lack of awareness.73 Regardless of the awareness creation works, 
increase in cartel arrangements from time to time call for another form of 
intervention.74 
Secondly, with respect to regions, there is no clear mandate given to regional 
governments to enforce anti-competitive laws. Part of this problem emanates 
from lack of decentralization of consumer protection enforcement as it will be 
discussed under subsequent section.  However, it is to be noted that such 
measures should be prudent, highly selective and based on concrete evidence 
because discretionary measures can open doors for corruption and unduly harm 
the private sector thereby causing scarcity in supply which, in effect, worsens 
the burden on consumers.  
5. The Gaps in Institutional Framework in the 
Enforcement Framework of Consumer Protection 
With the enactment of the Trade Competition and Consumer Protection 
Proclamation No.813/2014 (TCCPP), different organs have been established and 
entrusted with the powers and duties to enforce it. These are:  The Federal Trade 
                                           
71 See The Trade Practice Investigation Commission of Ethiopia, Four Years Performance 
Report of the Ethiopian Trade Practice Investigation Commission prepared on 24 
September 2008 (2004-2008); Interview with Merkebu Zeleke who was the Director 
General of both former TPCPA and the present TCCPA, supra note 63. 
72 Interview with Representative of Regulatory Department, Ministry of Trade on Feb 
23/2015 and Interview with Southern Nation, Nationalities and People Region Trade and 
Industry Bureau on January 28/2015. 
73 Roberto, Zavatta &Samuel Feyisa, supra note 63, p. 102. 
74 Merkebu Zeleke, supra note 63, and Interview with consumers and business community 
supra note 63. 
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Competition and Consumer Protection Authority (hereinafter called the 
“Authority”), Federal Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Appellate 
Tribunal, Regional Consumer Protection Judicial Organs and Appellate 
Tribunals, Ministry of Trade (MoT) and Regional Trade & Industry Bureaus 
(RTBs) and Courts both at federal and regional levels. 
5.1. The Trade Competition and Consumers Protection Authority: 
Gaps in structure and composition 
The TCCPP has established the Trade Competition and Consumer Protection 
Authority as an autonomous federal organ accountable to the MoT (art. 27). The 
Authority is headed by a Director General & Deputy Director General to be 
appointed by the Prime Minister upon recommendation by the MoT and the 
Authority is to be composed of judges, investigative officers, prosecutors and 
other staff (art. 28). The Authority shall have its head office in Addis Ababa and 
may establish branch offices elsewhere as may be necessary (art. 29). The 
Proclamation also envisages the establishment of regional consumer protection 
judicial organ (art. 34). 
One of the best practice principles for improving regulatory enforcement is 
the involvement of stakeholders in enforcement and compliance endeavours.75 
Market forces, the private sector and civil society support compliance and 
enforcement. These forces should thus be explored wherever possible because 
the problems cannot be addressed solely through inspections and enforcement 
thereby necessitating many other means of attaining the regulatory objectives.76 
The TCCPP has established the Authority without providing for 
representation of stakeholders especially, from the private sector and 
consumers.77 The Proclamation has repeated the mistake made under the 2010 
Proclamation. In this regard, it is plausible to say that the 2003 Proclamation, in 
spite of gaps in its implementation, was better than the subsequent two 
proclamations78 The failure to provide for the representation of stakeholders in 
the Authority can contribute to challenges in enforcement because competition 
and consumer protection in a market economy involve the interests of the 
business community and consumers in addition to the government.  
                                           
75 OECD, supra note 26, p. 5. 
76 Ibid. 
77 There is no a single provision dealing with the representation of the stakeholders in the 
TCCPP. 
 78 Article 13(1) of TCCPP provides for the representation of private organs, governments 
and consumers association. However, practically, all the members of the former 
Investigation Commission were from high ranking government officials (interviews with 
the former officials of the Commission). 
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The role of the government should be facilitation of the market with some 
prudent interventions when the market fails79. Failure to recognize the 
representation of the private sector in the enforcement of competition and 
consumer protection will inevitably pose a huge challenge, primarily, to the 
private sector and, ultimately, to the consumers. There are views which state the 
dominance of endowment-owned businesses, and a substantial regional 
development organizations in Ethiopia’s economy.80 As an expert in the Addis 
Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectorial Association (AACCSA) noted: 
The problem lies with the economic structure of the country… the question 
should be ‘who owns the economy?’…there is not enough playing field for 
private sector in our country. The large and medium scale economy are 
controlled by either the public sector or the political party affiliated 
enterprises...81   
According to the legal advisor of the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and 
Sectorial Associations (ECCSA) private sector representation in the Authority 
would encourage voluntary compliance by business persons to consumers’ 
protection regulations because it makes the business community own the issues 
of consumer protection.82 Moreover, most of the respondents from the private 
sector and Consumers’ Protection Association replied that their exclusion is 
adversely affecting their interest in the economy.83 
Biru Olbamo, the former Secretary of the Trade Practice Investigation 
Commission, stated that there is no explicit provision as to the representation of 
the private sectors and consumers in the Authority. He further noted that the 
government can take such representation into consideration while structuring the 
Authority as long as there is no prohibition to that effect. According to another 
respondent from the legal department of the MoT the exclusion of the 
aforementioned members from the Authority may not by itself be a problem, 
                                           
79  See the 1994 Agricultural-Led Industry Policy of Ethiopia (ADLI). The ADLI considers 
the private sector as an engine of the nation's economy.  Interview with officials of Addis 
Abeba Chamber of Commerce and Sectorial Association, Ethiopia Chamber of 
Commerce and Sectorial Association, and Ethiopian Consumers Association on Feb. 12-
15, 2013. All the interviewees believe in the need for the representation of the private 
sector and consumers. See also Industrial Development Strategy of Ethiopia prepared in 
1994. One of the seven core principles of the working policy of Ethiopia,   “Agricultural 
Development Led-industrialization” (ADLI), is making the private sector the engine of 
the economy. 
80  Sarah, V. and Mesfin, G. (2011). Rethinking Business and Politics In Ethiopia, Africa, 
Power and Politics Research Paper no.02, 2011. 
 81 Interview with a high ranking expert in AACCSA who did not consent to the disclosure 
of his name and identity, May 2, 2013. 
82 Interview with a legal advisor of ECCSA, Jan 10, 2014 
83 Interviews with consumers and business persons in Hawassa March 3-6, 2014. 
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and he added that what rather matters most is that decisions of the Authority are 
given in accordance with the law.  
There is no certainty as to the practicability or otherwise of the representation 
of the private sectors and consumers in the Authority. All members of the 2003 
Investigation Commission were from the government even while the legal 
provision of Proclamation No. 329/2003 provided for representation of the 
private sector and consumers’ association.84 The same holds true for the former 
Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Authority where all members of the 
Authority were from the government. Some developing countries embody the 
details of such representation in their legal frameworks.85 Malawi, Egypt, 
Zambia and South Africa are some examples of African countries which have 
detail legal frameworks dealing with the representation of various stakeholders 
in their competition and/or consumer protection authorities. Denmark, 
Switzerland and Swaziland are also countries whose competition laws have 
legal provisions dealing with mandatory representation of stakeholders in their 
competition authority. 
In addition to gaps related with lack of representation of the private sector 
and other stakeholders, there is another challenge that regional states in Ethiopia 
do not yet have their independent consumer protection law; nor do they have 
independent institutional frameworks for implementation.86 Even though the law 
envisages the establishment of a regional consumer protection judicial organ, it 
does not give administrative power to the organ; nor does it give the power to 
investigate and institute action against violators.87 The law also envisages the 
establishment of branches of the federal authority which have not been put into 
effect until now thereby leaving consumers in the regions outside the ambit of 
the envisaged protection.88 
According to the FDRE constitution, consumer protection is not under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, and matters that are not 
exclusively given to the federal government fall under the ambit of regional 
                                           
84 Supra note 78. 
85 CUTS, 2007, From the Bottom Up, Available at <www.cuts_international.org>, Visited 
on 12 September, 2014. See also, article 13 of the Egyptian Consumer Protection Law, 
Enacted by Law No. 67, 2006. It provides for the representation from General Association 
of Chamber of Commerce, Association of Egyptian Industry, The Special Union of 
Associations for Consumer Protection and Central Consumers and Cooperative 
Association in Egyptian Consumer Authority. 
86 Except for some sort of work processes established by the regions under the regional 
Trade Industry bureaus, there is no independent consumer protection authority or agency 
established by regions. 
87 See article 34 of the TCCPP,  supra note 12. 
88 Id., art 29. 
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powers. Cconsumer protection, as strongly argued, is not a commercial, but 
rather a civil matter.89  Though, arguably, the new law is said to have recognized 
consumer protection issues as regional matter90, it still does not recognize the 
power of the regions to enact their own consumer protection laws. This does not 
go in line with the Ethiopian federal system.91 The new law seems to have 
adopted executive federalism approach where the federal law maker enacts the 
law and regional governments apply the law made by the federal government.92 
Indeed, this is not envisaged to be a characteristic feature of Ethiopian 
federalism.93 In fact, one may argue that regional states do not need such 
recognition under federal law as their power is set out in the FDRE Constitution, 
and in effect, they can act with or without the federal consumer protection law’s 
recognition of their powers.  
However, this argument is not without challenge when we observe the 
existing constitutional set up of regional states and the practices in Ethiopia. 
According to almost all of the regional constitutions in Ethiopia, it is provided 
that the laws enacted by the regional councils should not contradict with federal 
laws and FDRE Constitution (See article 51:1 of SNNPR Constitution, article 
49:1 of Amhara Region Constitution, article 51:3(3:1) of Gambela Region 
Constitution, article 47(3)(a) of Afar Constitution, article 49(3)(a) of  Oromiya 
Constitution and article 49(3)(a) of Somali Regional State Constitution). This 
might be one of the reasons for the failure of the regional states to enact their 
own consumer protection laws.  
5.2. Institutional mandate of the Ministry of Trade and Regional 
Trade Bureaus  
The Ministry of Trade (MoT) and Regional Trade & Industry Bureaus (RTBs) 
are the most important organs in connection with the implementation of 
consumer protection under the TCCPP. According to article 23(5), MoT and 
RTBs shall have power to implement part of the Proclamation which deals with 
consumer protection except some of the provisions which are incumbent upon 
the Authority. This mandate is given to these organs mainly because matters of 
consumer protection need interventions of government in favour of the 
                                           
89 Interview with Ato Merkebu Zeleke, the General Director of the TCCPA, on 21/01/2015. 
According to Merkebu, the  law recognizes  the consumer protection matter as a civil 
matter. See also the discussions in the Draft Trade Competition and Consumer Protection 
Proclamation, 2014.  
90 Ibid.  
91According to the FDRE constitution, Ethiopian federalism follows a horizontal system and 
all the three organs of the government: legislative, executive and judiciary in both federal 
and regional level have equal power in their respective spheres.  See article 50 (8). 
92 See for example are articles 37(3), 23(5), 47(2) & 4(1) of TCCPP, supra note 12.  
93 See FDRE Constitution, articles 50(8) and 52.   
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consumers where the market fails.94 The MoT and RTBs are government organs 
connected with trade in federal and regional governments respectively.  This can 
be seen from the present Ministry of Trade Establishment Proclamation No. 
691/2010 which defines the powers and duties of executive organs of FDRE 
government. 95 Article 21 of Proclamation No. 691/2010 provides that the 
Ministry of Trade has the power to promote the expansion of domestic trade and 
take appropriate measures to maintain lawful trade practices. 
The Ministry of Trade (MoT) has the power to issue directives and public 
notices for the implementation of the Proclamation (art. 46), the power to 
recommend or nominate the Director General and Deputy Directors of the 
Authority and arguably96, judges of the Authority. The Ministry has the power 
to determine and apply price regulation and distribution of basic goods and 
services upon the approval of the Council of Ministers (arts. 25 and 26 
respectively). 
Regional Trade Bureaus (RTBs) are also given power to deal with the 
implementation of the Proclamation (art.23), duty to inspect any acts of 
hoarding or diverting of goods and to ban the distribution of goods and services 
that do not fulfil the standard of health and safety (art.23:1) & cause the disposal 
of goods that are spoiled and are dangerous to human health and safety (art. 
23:4).  
The Ministry of Trade (MoT) and Regional Trade Bureaus (RTBs) are 
entrusted with the power to conduct investigation in connection with the 
implementation of the Proclamation and to regulate distribution of basic goods 
and services (art. 44). The MoT has also the power to issue public notice and 
directive for the implementation of the Proclamation, in addition to which it can 
initiate regulations to be issued by the Council of Ministers (art.55).  The MoT, 
when it appears necessary, submits to the Council of Ministers its study on basic 
goods and services that shall be subject to price regulation for approval (art.46). 
Generally, one of the most important aspects of the new Proclamation in this 
regard is its recognition of the power of regional states over consumer protection 
                                           
94  Display prices of goods and services, labels of goods, issuing receipts and other 
obligations embodied in part three of the proclamation are regulatory requirements. 
95 See The Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE 
Proclamation, Proc. No. 691, 2010, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 17th Year No. 1. 
96 Article 38 (1) states that, “Each division of the adjudicative tribunal shall have one 
presiding and two other judges to be appointed by the Prime Minister.” But this article 
does not address the question ‘who nominates the judges to be appointed then?’ It is 
plausible to argue that the MoT is the relevant organ for this function because, it is the 
relevant ministry to trade/market related issues (see also article 21); on the other hand, the 
MoT is given the power to recommend the director general of the Authority. 
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matters, in spite of the ambiguity and inadequate empowerment as discussed 
below. 
5.3 Gaps related with inadequate empowerment of Regional 
Trade Bureaus 
Even though bringing the Regional Trade Bureaus (RTBs) into the picture in 
relation to the implementation of consumer protection in some areas under the 
Proclamation can be taken as a progress at least as compared with the former 
Proclamation, it does not sufficiently “empower”97 the RTBs so as to enable 
them effectively enforce consumer protection in their respective spheres. For 
example, the Proclamation does not empower the regional concerned bodies to 
regulate prices of basic goods and services. As the issue of power relationships 
between the federal government and regional governments fall outside the scope 
of this article,98 focus is made on the effect of denying RTBs of such power on 
the effective enforcement of consumer protection.  
Under articles 25 and 26, the MoT is given the power to regulate prices of 
basic goods and services, and distribution of basic goods. By virtue of Article 
25, MoT shall, when deemed necessary, “submit to the Council of Ministers its 
study on basic goods and services that shall be subject to price regulation and 
upon approval publish their list and prices in public notices”. And according to 
Article 26, the Ministry “in consultation with other concerned government 
organs may determine the conditions of distribution, sale and movement of basic 
goods and services and, as may be necessary, order the business person to 
replenish the stock of the same”. 
As we may see from the above two provisions, regulating prices of basic 
goods and services, and the distribution of basic goods fall under the mandate of 
MoT without recognizing that RTBs have similar power. This may pose threat 
to the effective enforcement of the Proclamation for at least two reasons.  
 Firstly, regional organs are more relevant or closer to determine whether 
certain goods and services are basic or not depending upon the existing realities 
                                           
97 The writer is in doubt as to whether or not the parliament of the federal government of 
Ethiopia has power to “empower” the regional trade bureaus of the regional government. 
Consumer protection is a civil matter and not a commercial matter, and such matter is not 
explicitly given to the federal government under FDRE Constitution. 
98 Questions such as: (a) whether the relationship between the federal government and 
regional governments in Ethiopia is horizontal or vertical, (b) whether the federal 
government can play a supervisory role over the regional governments, (c) whether the 
federal lawmaking body can confer or deny to confer or impose duties on the regional 
executive bodies in relation to enforcement of the federal laws, (d) whether consumer 
protection is a federal matter or a state matter,  and similar questions need further 
researches.  
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in their respective regions.99 For example, “kocho” may be basic to SNNPR than 
‘Injera’ which could be basic to Amhara or Tigrai regions or other regions. 
Prices may also differ depending upon different factors which are not evenly 
distributed throughout all regions. Arbaminch Town Trade & Industry Bureau 
and Hosana Town Trade Bureau of the SNNPR may, for instance, set prices for 
some fruits deviating from the price caps determined by MoT. As Ato Yohannes 
Mima from SNNPR Trade Bureau Trade Practice Investigation and Research 
Department stated: “The Minstry of Trade fixes the prices of some of the basic 
goods taking into consideration the market situation in Addis Ababa which is 
the central market of the country and gives us the ‘price caps’ thus determined 
by the Ministry”. He added that the Bureau “re-determines the prices set 
accordingly by taking different factors like, cost of transportation and other 
costs into account and apply them accordingly”. He also said that “we have also 
the power to regulate the prices of some other basic goods and services which 
are not subjected to such regulation by the Ministry.” 
But the most important question here is whether the regional states have their 
own consumer protection laws. If they are enforcing the federal law, the 
Proclamation does not give power to RTBs to regulate prices of basic goods and 
services. In fact, there is no regional state in Ethiopia which has its own law and 
authority on consumer protection.100 
Secondly, and in fact arguably,101 the issue of price regulation is not a 
competition law matter; rather it is regulation of consumer protection. And the 
issue of consumer protection is not under the exclusive jurisdictions of the 
federal government under the FDRE Constitution.102 In other words, the 
Regional Trade Bureaus should have been given power to make studies on price 
regulation of basic goods and services and submit the study to the regional state 
administration which is the appropriate counterpart of the Council of Ministers. 
 
                                           
99 Article 2(1) of the TPCPP defines basic goods and services to mean goods or services 
related to the daily need of consumers, the shortage of which in the market may lead to 
unfair trade practice. From this definition, we can see that there are no objective criteria 
to determine whether a certain good or service is basic or not. 
100 Interview with Merkebu Zeleke, the Director General of the Trade Practice and 
Consumer Protection Authority, 21/01/2015. 
101 It might be an arguable issue because commercial matter under the FDRE Constitution is 
classified as the federal matter and that the consumer issues we are raising here are 
related to market practices. 
102 See article 52(1) cumulative with 55 of FDRE Constitution (1995), Negarit Gazeta, Year 
1, No.1, August 1995.  
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6. Challenges in Consumer Protection Enforcement 
Strategy through Price Regulation  
There are three types of price regulation strategies, namely (a) Direct price 
control, (b) Rate of Return Regulation (RRR), and (c) Price-cap regulation. 
Direct price control involves direct fixation of the prices of products and 
services by the regulator or government.103 Approval of price changes (increases 
& decreases) is made by government or by the regulator.104 Since price increases 
are usually politically unpopular, approval tends to be usually given with 
reluctance and delays. This is increasingly seen to be inappropriate in a market 
economy. This kind of price regulation is unpopular, anti-competitive, 
interventionist, outdated and does not take different factors such as inflation into 
consideration.105 
The second price regulation strategy is Rate of Return Regulation (RRR) 
which essentially involves the limitation of profits at a ‘reasonable’ level (i.e., 
determining profit margin for traders or business organizations)106 after having 
considered necessary costs.  The experience in the US, for example indicates 
that the use of RRR may involve long arguments as to what a ‘reasonable’ rate 
of return is.107 It may also involve detailed and long arguments over what costs 
were necessarily (and efficiently) incurred.108  
The third strategy is price-cap regulation whereby a service provider’s or 
seller's price increases would be limited to the rate of inflation less an agreed 
“X” factor (based in principle on expected productivity improvement of traders 
or business organization).109 Essentially the price cap scheme restricts price 
increases to ‘CPI – X’ where: CPI (Consumer Price Index) is the inflation 
rate.110  If inflation is, for example, 8% and the “X” factor is set at 3% the price 
cap becomes “8% - 3%”. This means, price increases will be restricted to no 
more than 5% per year for the duration for the application of the formula. In 
principle, there would be no restriction on the level of profits thereby making it 
less intrusive, more popular and conventional. 
                                           
103 Patrick  Xavier (2012). Pricing Strategies in the Context of Price Regulation, Discussion 
Paper School of Business, Swinburne University, Melbourne, Australia. 
104 Ibid.  
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
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In January 2011, Ethiopia’s Ministry of Trade made price regulation on 18 
consumer goods.  As discussed above. 111 the Ministry fixed the prices on the 
goods based on ‘Direct price control method. 112 The Ministry announced its 
decision of price control on ‘basic goods and services’ in reaction to the 
inflation which it believed was “man-made inflation”113. Rice, imported milk, 
soap, beer, soft drinks, orange, banana, pasta and meat were among the 
commodities subjected to direct price control.  
The TCCPP defines ‘basic goods and services’ as "goods or services related 
to the daily need of consumers, the shortage of which in the market may lead to 
unfair trade practice.114  From the legal point of view, it is arguable whether 
these items are basic goods. Secondly, goods like, injera, onions, and services 
like house lease or rent are more basic to Ethiopian consumers than the goods 
listed above. So, the regulation lacked "prioritization" with regard to areas of 
intervention. 
Moreover, there were gaps in making a deep pre-intervention study. In 
particular, it did not take different factors affecting the prices of goods and 
services into consideration. As Zakarias Mekonen Yigzaw observed: 
... producers/importers, suppliers, wholesalers and retailers were mostly not 
happy with the price ceiling measure because of many reasons; First, the 
price setting does not actually consider the cost factors arising from 
importing with hard currency, passing with different legal and transportation 
fees, labor and sales people as well as rent costs for shops and thus it barely 
makes them make profit.  Second, even after price ceiling was made, it was 
not done uniformly. … Thirdly, [there] were [businesspersons who felt] 
warned and frightened by the government while [they] were doing [contrary 
to] the ‘Idea of Free market’ … .115 
Although the regulation was welcomed by consumers at its early phase, 
consumers themselves were not eventually happy because it caused complicated 
problems of shortage of items, poor quality service and unnecessary waste of 
                                           
111 See also Thomas Wold & Grum Abebe (2013). Urban Food Retail in Africa: The Case of 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
112 This approach does not take inflation into consideration. It is easy to fix the prices but 
difficult to apply them. 
113 The Former Prime Minister and other higher officials of Ethiopian government held that 
the 2011 inflation of prices of goods and services were attributable to the act of the 
business community (Source: www.ethiofirst.info.news last visited on May 2, 2013 
114 See Article 2:3 of the TCCPP, supra note 12. 
115 Zekarias Mekonnen Yigzaw (2011). “Effects of Recent Price Ceiling On the Demand and 
Supply of Agricultural Products: A case of Addis Ababa”, School of Agriculture, 
Economics and Agribusiness, A case study report to supplement OER materials of Ag 
Share pilot project , Haramaya University, Ethiopia. 
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time due to long queue at distribution points.116 This led to series of 
complications. For example, the initial fixed price for a litre of oil was ETB 
16.50 which failed to materialize because cost of imported oil per litre without 
adding transportation, and loading and unloading cost was over ETB 20.117 
Following negotiations and discussion between wholesalers, importers and the 
government, the price was re-adjusted to ETB 21.50 and then to ETB 24.50. 
Few days later, palm oil disappeared from the market. Once again, the MoT 
decided to collect all edible palm oil from importers who had ordered supplies at 
higher prices due to increase in international market.118 The MoT then tried to 
distribute the palm oil at a fixed price thereby organizing small consumers 
associations at kebele level. However, scarcity of oil persisted.119 These trial and 
error measures can, among other things, be attributed to lack of pre-intervention 
analysis or studies prior to the determination and application of the regulation. 
Conclusion  
Even though there are no uniform enforcement strategies and practices for 
consumer protection across the world, the pursuance of advocacy and preventive 
approaches are more effective in contrast to punitive and interventionist 
approaches. The consumer protection enforcement strategies that are advocated 
by many scholars include prioritizing the areas of intervention based on 
comprehensive study, flexibility and promotion of self-regulation, and 
coordination and cooperation of enforcing institutions with other relevant organs 
that have similar objectives.  These effective strategies are adopted and applied 
in the competition and consumer protection enforcement frameworks of many 
countries.  
International good practices show that depending upon country specific 
socio-economic and political realities, the common designs that are put into 
practice are the partially integrated authority model, integrated authority model 
and separate authority model. As briefly discussed in Section 2, each model has 
its own advantages and disadvantages. It is, however, to be noted that the model 
which is adopted should be supported by a strong and efficient structural and 
organizational set up.  
Despite the progresses made by Ethiopia to bring about an effective 
consumer protection regime by adopting laws and establishing institutions, I 
                                           
116 Ibid. 
117 Interview with wholesalers in Hawassa City On June 3, 2013. 
118 Fortune, “Government to Take Over Imported Palm Oil”, Vol.11, No. 569, Sunday, 
March 27, 2011. 
119 Observations made in Yirgalem, in Sidama zone and most places in Addis Ababa, Gulele 
sub-city (Menen and Shiro Meda). 
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argue that the present enforcement framework has gaps because it failed to 
recognize the representation of major stakeholders such as consumers and 
business persons in the enforcement authorities while the existing reality and 
international practices justify their recognition. The inadequate emphasis given 
for competition promotion, failure to recognize representation of major 
stakeholders in the Consumer Protection Authority and failure to decentralize 
the consumer protection affairs are identified as the major challenges. Lack of 
extensive pre-intervention study, failure to give priority to areas of greater 
consumer risks and failure to take measures against anti-competitive practices of 
traders and business organizations are found to be the major practical failures of 
the enforcing institutions. These gaps have resulted in steadily increasing 
problems in the avenues of fair competition and consumer protection, which I 
argue are having some manifestations of crisis in consumer welfare. 
The gaps and challenges discussed in this article thus call for amendments in 
the law to include mandatory provisions that require the representation of 
stakeholders, especially, consumers and the business community in the 
Authority. Since consumer protection is a civil matter than commercial, the 
respective regions can enact their own consumer protection law and establish an 
independent consumer protection institution for its enforcement. Moreover, for 
the proper determination and successful application of a price regulation, 
Regional Trade Bureaus ought to be empowered to regulate prices of basic 
goods and services in their respective regions. In regulating prices of basic 
goods and services, the conventional method i.e. price cap regulation approach 
(highlighted in Section 6) rather than the direct price control approach should 
be adopted by taking various factors into consideration.  Prior to such 
intervention, however, institutions entrusted with the duty to enforce consumer 
protection regulations should conduct pre-intervention studies as to 
prioritization, determination, application and cost benefit analysis.  
Mere focus on consumers indeed renders it difficult to bring about long term 
consumer welfare because a two-sided problem cannot be resolved from a single 
dimension. Needless-to-say, competitive markets deliver better protection to 
consumers than the ‘benefits’ accrued from protective government intervention 
in a non-competitive market. The enforcement framework should not thus solely 
target at a single dimension, but should rather maintain the balance between 
consumer protection and competition promotion. This requires the 
empowerment of enforcement institutions to enable them work more on the 
promotion of competition and at the same time take effective legal measures 
against anti-competitive practices.                                                   ■ 
 
 
  
